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LEGISLATIVE POWER AND JUDICIAL 
POWER 
John Harrison* 
There are two possible accounts of the dffference between the 
legislative and judicial powers granted hy the Constitution and each 
has surprising implications. According to one, the difference is 
purely between two different govern1nent .fiLnctions, making legal 
rules and applying them. flthat is correct, then the legislative power 
can accomplish any legal result the judicial power can, hut not vice 
versa (putting aside constitutional limits on the legislative power 
that do not result from its separation fronz Judicial power). 
According to the other, the two powers di.ff'er because only the 
judicial power may operate on certain legal interests. fl that is 
correct, the structural difference between the two powers depends 
on differences anzong the legal rules being made or applied, not the 
functions of government institutions. That understanding of the 
distinction underlay nineteenth century vested rights doctrine and 
underlies the Supreme Court's current doctrine that limits 
Congress' power to undo final fudgnzents. Although the wholly 
structural understanding of the two powers may seem to make their 
separate vesting in independent institutions pointless, it does not, 
and not only because constitutional restrictions limit Anzerican 
legislatures' ability to create any legal rules they wish. Even a 
legislature with that power would he substantially constrained hy 
an independent judiciary, because it would have to exercise its 
power openly, through legal rules, and not covertly, hy influencing 
the judge's incentives. 
Saint Augustine remarked that he understood time until 
someone asked him to explain it.' That legislative and judicial 
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1. SAINT AlJ(JlJSTINE THE CONFESSIONS 217 (Philip Burton, trans., Rohin Lane 
Fox, cu., 2001) ("What, then, is time? As long as no one asks me, I know; hut if someone 
asks me and I try to explain, I do not know."). 
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power are conceptually distinct may seem obvious, but explaining 
the difference between them is not so easy. 
This Essay will argue that there are two possible theories of 
the difference between the legislative and judicial powers referred 
to by the Constitution, and that both of them have surprising 
implications. According to one account, the difference between 
the two powers is wholly structural, in that it depends entirely on 
the functions of government institutions. This account regards the 
difference between legislative and judicial power as the difference 
between the power to make legal rules and the power to apply 
them. The surprising implication is that although the powers differ 
in the form through which they are exercised, the legislative 
power can bring about any legal effect the judicial power can bring 
about, including the alteration of legal positions established by 
prior litigation. Some legal effects, however, can be achieved only 
by legislation. If the two powers are understood wholly 
structurally, the judicial power amounts to a sub-part of the 
legislative power. 
The alternative to that conclusion is that the difference 
between the two powers is substantive in that the legislative 
power is limited in its operation with respect to some legal 
interests but not others. On this account, the limits of legislative 
power relative to judicial power are marked by legal interests that 
legislation may not change but that may be operated on by judicial 
power pursuant to preexisting rules. Some rights are vested. 
Those rights are identified, not by distinguishing between making 
and applying rules, but on other grounds. The classic nineteenth-
century doctrine of vested rights was often described in terms of 
the distinction between legislative and judicial power, so the 
substantive roots of one leading account of that distinction are 
reasonably well known. As I will explain, the Supreme Court's 
current doctrine limiting Congress' power to undo final judgments 
is also substantive and not structural. 
Of those two conclusions, perhaps the more surprising is the 
first, and it may seem so implausible that it cannot be correct. If 
legislative power can accomplish anything judicial power can, 
what is the point of assigning them to distinct institutions that are 
designed to be politically independent of one another? Even if the 
legislature has that much power, which legislatures subject to 
constitutional limitations do not, judicial independence can force 
legislators to exercise their authority through written law, and 
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hence publicly and with as much clarity as is needed to constrain 
the courts. 
This Essay begins by explaining how the power to make rules 
is in effect a perfect substitute for the power conclusively to apply 
them. It also points out that two possible constraints on legislative 
power that might be thought to be structural- requirements of 
generality and prospectivity-cannot plausibly be attributed to 
the legislative power granted by Article I of the Constitution. If 
the difference between legislative and judicial power involves 
only the functions of government institutions, a statute can do 
anything a judgment can do. The Essay then argues that 
understandings of the difference between the two powers that do 
constrain the legislature rest, not on different functions of 
government, but on the differences among legal interests. That 
was quite clear about the nineteenth-century doctrine of vested 
rights. Under that doctrine, courts held that some legal interests 
were immune from change by legislation enacted after the interest 
was created.2 That doctrine was often justified as reflecting the 
separation of legislative and judicial power, but protected only 
some legal interests, interests that were identified on grounds of 
justice and the public good. Perhaps more surprising is that the 
Supreme Court's current doctrine concerning legislative 
interference with judgments has the same feature: It protects 
some interests and not others, and identifies the protected 
interests on grounds that do not derive from different government 
functions. Indeed, the distinction the Court draws closely 
resembles old-style vested rights doctrine. The Essay concludes 
by explaining how separation of powers furthers the rule of law 
even if the legislature has complete control over the law's content. 
2. An examph.: well known to contemporary readers is Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 51X (1XllJ), in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Contracts Clause protected Dartmouth College's corporate charter from legislative 
change. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. X7 (1 X 1 0), the Court through Chid Justice Marshall 
held that Georgia legislation purporting to rescind a grant of land previously made hy the 
legislature similarly violated the Contracts Clause. Marshall's opinion in Fletcher shows 
that he viewed the constitutional protection of contracts as only one manifestation of a 
broader principle that legislatures could not interfere with vested rights. "But. if an act he 
done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo il. The past cannot he recalled hy 
the most absolute power. Conveyances have been made, those conveyances have vested 
h.:gal estates, and, if those estates may he seized hy the sovereign authority, still, that they 
originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to he a fact." !d. at 135. 
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I. MAKING AND APPLYING LEGAL RULES 
Perhaps the most natural account of the difference between 
legislative and judicial power is that it is the difference between 
two functions of government institutions: making legal rules and 
authoritatively applying legal rules. 
If that is the difference, then a legislature can in effect do 
anything a court can do, but not vice versa. When they decide 
lawsuits, courts bring about two kinds of legal results. First, they 
conclusively resolve disputed questions of law and fact.-"~ If A sues 
B for breach and the court concludes that B is in breach, that 
conclusion will bind the parties in the future. Declaratory 
judgments do explicitly what all merits judgments do implicitly, 
conclusively establishing the legal relations of the parties under 
the law as it stands when the judgment is issued.4 
Adjudication can also involve the creation of new legal rules 
that bind the parties. If A prevails in a suit for damages, the 
judgment creates a new legal obligation, into which A's pre-
existing claim is said to be merged.5 Now B must pay A, and A has 
no other claim against B based on those facts. Injunctions 
similarly create new, highly specific, legal rules by imposing 
obligations on the party enjoined. A manifestation of this point is 
the crime of contempt for violating an injunction, which is distinct 
from the substantive law on which the injunction rests.6 
A government institution that can make the legal rules 
whatever it wants them to be can in effect perforn1 both of those 
functions. If two parties have a dispute about the consequences of 
pre-existing legal rules for their current relationship, a law-
making institution can provide that whatever those consequences 
may have been, they shall henceforth be as the institution 
]. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ~ 27 (J()X2) (judicial decision of 
litigated issues is conclusive on the parties in suhscqucnt cases). 
4. lJ ndcr the Declaratory .J udgmcnt Act, federal courts may "declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such lal declaration." 2X U.S.C.A. 
~ 2201 (West 2010). 
5. RESTATEMI'NT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ~ IX cmt. a (I()X2) (judgment for 
plaintiff extinguishes plaintiff's claim and suhstitutcs the judgment for it); hi. at cmt. c 
(judgment for plain till creates a dcht in that amount from defendant to plaintiff). 
6. Violation of a federal court's injunction is the crime of contempt. IX U.S.C.A. 
~ 402 (West 2016). As that statute shows, federal court orders create ohligations under 
federal law. Those orders arc often hascd on non-federal law, like the law of contract. See, 
e.g, Green Stripe, Inc. v. Berny's lntcrnacionalc, IYJ F. Supp. 2d 51 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(granting preliminary injunction to remedy hrcach of contract and unjust enrichment). 
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prescribes. If A and Bare in an automobile accident, an institution 
with that power can say that henceforth B shall have no obligation 
to pay A damages arising out of that accident, whatever B's 
obligation previously may have been. A new legal rule could also 
say that future relations between A and B shall be governed on 
the assumption that certain events had happened in the past, and 
thus effectively establish facts the way a court can. An institution 
that can make rules thus can produce the same result as a court 
does in a case for damages. It can also provide that B shall have 
an obligation to pay, again without regard to what the parties' 
relationship may have been. It can state rules forB's conduct that 
replace or go beyond the rules that existed before, and so generate 
the same result as an injunction. 
Anything a law-applying institution can do a law-making 
institution can do, but the reverse does not hold. A law-applying 
institution cannot announce a wholly new rule, not derived from 
existing law, and use it to create new obligations like a damages 
judgment. Application is application of the pre-existing rules.7 If 
legislative and judicial power are understood as law-making and 
law-applying power, judicial power is a sub-part of legislative 
power from the standpoint of legal consequences though not of 
legal formalities. 
Despite the long-standing association of legislative power 
with generality and prospectivity, neither of those features 
necessarily accompanies the power to make legal rules, because 
legal rules can be specific and retrospective. An example of 
specificity in the Constitution itself is in the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, which provides that it ''shall not apply to any person 
holding the office of President when this article was proposed by 
the Congress.'' 11 Congress proposes constitutional amendments at 
7. Courts arc law-applying and not law-making institutions in the sense in which I 
am using the terms, although some courts make l<lw in a manner of speaking hy setting 
precedents. Whcn a court's interprctation of a legal norm is taken as conclusivc hy later 
courts, as can happen under standard American principlcs of stare decisis, the earlier 
court's interprctation functions as if it werc the norm itsdf, Clnd so announcing the 
intcrprctation can function as thc creation of a norm. Espccially whcn thc norm is itself 
unwritten, as arc common law principles, it is quitc common and natural to characterizc 
the courts' conclusivc expositions of thosc principles as judgc-madc law. Despite that 
functional similarity, courts do not makc law in that thcy arc supposcd to act only on thc 
h<lsis of some law or hody of law that they did not exist hcfore thcy intcrprctcd it. Thc 
distinction can hecome attenuated in practice, but in principlc it is central to the concepts 
of adjudication and judicial power. 
X. U.S. CONST. amend. XII,* 1. 
300 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:295 
particular times, and only one person can be President at one 
time. Despite its extreme specificity, the proviso is a legal rule. It 
has legal consequences when applied to facts. 
In similar fashion, a rule can be retrospective and still be a 
rule; if that were not possible, the problem of retrospectivity 
would not arise. Although legal rules cannot change the past, they 
can direct that future actions depend on events that have already 
occurred, and so be both prospective and retrospective at the 
same time. An ex post facto law, the classic example of an 
objectionably retrospective rule, can operate precisely because it 
is a rule for future conduct that depends on past events: under an 
ex post facto law, officials are directed to irrtpose criminal 
punishment on the basis of past events.9 Unrestricted law-making 
power can be retrospective as easily as it can be specific. 10 
Perhaps the legislative power granted by Article I of the 
Constitution is not the unrestricted law-making power I have 
described, because it is limited to general and prospective rules. 
Such a conception of legislative power would be structural and not 
substantive in that it would apply alike to all legal interests, 
depending on a description of the functions of government 
institutions and not the different interests involved in different 
situations. That understanding of legislative power would 
complement a description of judicial power according to which it 
alone acts specifically and retrospectively. 
Accepted legislative functions, however, include highly 
specific rules, as American constitutional practice reflects. 
Congress has long conferred benefits on named individuals, for 
example by indemnifying executive officials who have incurred 
personal liability in the course of their responsibilities. 11 Highly 
lJ. After descrihing Caligula's supposed practice of writing laws in small print and 
posting them on a high pillar, Blackstone turned to ex post facto laws: ·'There is a still more 
unrcasonahk method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an 
action ... is committed. the legislator then for the first time declares it to have heen a 
crime, and inflicts a punishment who has committed it.'' See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 46 (1HlJ3). Although the law comes after 
the action, the punishment comes after the law. 
10. Just as the Constitution provides an example of extreme specificity, so it provides 
an example of a retrospective rule. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes 
political disahilitit:s on certain individuals who participated in insurrection or rehdlion 
hdore it was adopted. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,* 3. 
11. Congress indemnified Captain George Little of the Navy for the judgment 
against him personally in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1H04), in which the Supreme Court 
found that Little had acted in excess of his statutory authority in seizing the plaintiff's 
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specific statutes that impose disadvantages are constitutionally 
problematic, but that is because they impose disadvantages, not 
because they are highly specific. 12 Legislative power can 
legitimately operate with complete specificity. 13 
Whether the legislative power in Article I may operate 
retrospectively is a more involved question, because the 
distinction between prospective and retrospective legislation 
requires some careful thought. The broadest conception of 
retrospectivity includes all rules that change the legal 
consequences of events that have already occurred. A law that 
does so need not require any knowledge about the past for its 
application. If a legislature were to eliminate the remedy of 
specific performance, the consequences of earlier contracts would 
change, but a court would not need to know whether the parties 
had actually made a contract in order to apply the rule. 
Nineteenth-century judges who were zealous in their protection 
of vested rights recognized substantial authority to change the law 
of remedies as it applied to existing contracts, provided the 
substance of the right involved was not impaired. 14 Even less 
vessel. Act for the Relief of George Little, ch. 4, 6 Stat. 6J ( IX07). See James E. Pfander & 
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrong\· and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government 
Accountability in the Early Republic, X5 N.Y.U. L. REV. IX62 (2010) (describing early 
congressional indemnification practice). Congress began passing private hills lor the relief 
of private individuals who had suffered tort-like damage from government activities in the 
1790s. See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handlin~ of Tort Claims A~ainst 1he Federal 
Government, 9 L. & CONTI:MP. PROBS. J II, J II (I 942). 
12. The Supreme Court found that a statute that in effect discharged three 
specifically identified individuals from federal employment was a hill of attainder because 
it imposed punishment on them. See United States v. Lovett, J2X U.S. JOJ, J !h (1 946). 
B. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 4JJ U.S. 425 (1977). When formn President 
Nixon entered into an agreement concerning his presidential records pursuant to which 
some of them would he destroyed if he so directed, id. at 4J 1-412, Congress passed a 
statute that referred to Nixon hy name and forbade destruction of the records, id. at 429. 
In response to the argument that the legislation was a hill of attainder. the< 'ourt found 
that Nixon was a "legitimate class of one" because Congress acted on the basis of 
permissible reasons- the preservation of presidential records- that at the time applied 
only to him. !d. at 472. 
14. An important example was the abolition of imprisonment for debt, which the 
Court regarded as permissible with respect to existing and future contracts. "The 
distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to 
enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. 
Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly he modified as 
the wisdom of the nation shall direct. Confinement of the debtor may he a punishment for 
not performing his contract, or may he allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. 
But the state may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave 
the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the 
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controversial examples of acceptable exercises of legislative 
power that change legal consequences are easy to find. Changes 
in the formalities of title transfer, for example, alter the legal 
powers that property owners acquire when they take title. Laws 
like that are in the broadest sense retrospective, but are also 
within the legislative power as it is generally understood. 15 
A more plausible place to draw the line between law-making 
and legislative power may seem to be at rules that require some 
information about past events for their application. Ex post facto 
laws have that feature. But so do other rules that are clearly 
exercises of legislative power. As with specificity, laws conferring 
benefits provide historical examples. In the later nineteenth 
century, Congress provided pensions for Union veterans of the 
Civil War, not by name, but by a rule that depended on their 
earlier military service. 16 Even some burdens imposed 
retrospectively are unproblematic exercises of legislative power. 
When a state raises its drinking age, the new and n1ore restrictive 
rule depends for its application on earlier events, but is no less 
legislation for that reason. 17 Quarantines for individuals who have 
prisoner, docs not impair its obligation." Sturges v. Crowninshicld, 17 U.S. 122, 200-01 
(l?WJ) (Marshall, C.J.). 
15. Although it may seem natural to say that a change in the formalities of transfer 
operates only prospectively, that is not correct. Because all laws arc in one sense 
prospective, it is easy to cmphasi:~.c the prospective aspect of a rule as a way of expressing 
the conclusion that it is permissible. The fact that a rule with some retrospective feature is 
acceptable docs not make it wholly prospective, however. Acquisition of ownership brings 
with it legal powers like transfer, and changing those powers changes the legal 
consequences of acquisition. 
16. For example, in 1 H90 Congress substantially increased the disability benefits of 
Union Civil War veterans, giving them pensions for disabilities that were not related to 
war service. The new benefit was not given by name, hut was based on past events, being 
available to honorably discharged veterans who served more than ninety days in the War 
of the Rebellion. Act of June 27, 1X90, ch. 634,26 Stat. L. 1H2, * 2. 
17. States that raise their drinking age may ''grandfather'' individuals who have 
acquired the right to drink hut arc still below the new drinking age, like someone who 
recently turned eighteen when that was the minimum age and now faces a minimum of 
twenty-one. F.J.:., 64 Del. Laws 546 (increase in drinking age from twenty to twenty-one 
not applicable to individuals who arc twenty on effective date). But someone who turned 
eighteen shortly after the change was subject to the new more restrictive and retrospective 
law. As to that person, the law is retrospective: its application depends on past events (the 
person's date of birth) and it changes the future consequences of those events, so that 
someone who would have been allowed to drink upon reaching the old drinking age now 
is not. One might say that the person who had turned eighteen had acquired the right to 
drink while the person who had not had never done so. That is true, hut also demonstrates 
the attraction of a distinction based, not simply on rctrospcctivity, hut on vested rights. An 
increase in the drinking age that is not grandfathcrcd operates retrospectively upon both 
those who lose the permission to drink and those whose permission is only delayed, hut 
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been exposed to a contagious disease fall into the same category, 
requiring infonnation about the past for their application, but also 
qualifying as legislation.'N 
Ex post facto laws, by contrast, are defined not only by their 
reference to the past, but by criteria having nothing to do either 
with past or future or the functions of government. Only criminal 
punishments qualify as ex post facto laws, and criminal 
punishment is identified by the interests on which the law 
operates and the reasons on which it rests. 1l) As the quarantine 
example demonstrates, not al1 burdens based on prior events are 
punitive because some are imposed for other purposes. Much the 
same is true with respect to specificity and bills of attainder: a law 
can be extremely specific, can even impose a burden as opposed 
to providing a benefit, and still not be a bill of attainder. If a class 
of one is legitimate, the rule using it is not a bill of attainder, and 
legitimacy goes to the reasons on which the legislature acts. 
Judicial decisions are based on past events, but they actual1y 
affect future events, including the future consequences of prior 
occurrences. The power to make rules for the future therefore can 
accomplish anything courts can accomplish. If legislatures hold 
that power by virtue of being legislatures, they can do anything a 
court can do. 
only the former will have had that permission and lost it. The tendency to say th<lt only the 
former h<lvc hccn subject to <l retrospective law shows how deeply vested rights <lnd 
retrospcctivity arc <lSsociatcd. They arc nevertheless conceptually distinct. 
1H. Under kder<ll qu<lr<lntinc l<lw, the Puhlic Hc<llth Service may detain individu<lls 
in order to prevent the sprc<ld of communic<lhlc disease, without regard to whether the 
individu<ll involved hccamc infected hdorc or after the qu<lrantinc order was imposed. See 
42 U.S.C.A. * 264 (West 2016). Quarantines <llso make the point that lcgisl<ltion may he 
keyed, not only to prior events. hut to prior decisions hy individuals, for cx<lmplc the 
decision to travel to <l pl<lcc that l<ltcr proves to he a source of infectious disease. 
llJ. A classic statement of the stand<lrd interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses 
appears in Justice Chase's seriatim opinion in Calda v. Bull, 3 U.S. 3H6 (17lJH). The clause 
in Article I, Section 10, which applies to the st<ltcs, requires "that the Legislatures of the 
several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done hy a subject, or citizen, which shall have 
relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it." !d. at 3lJO. J usticc Chase 
explained that the clause protects "personal security" from criminal punishment, hut not 
"priv<lte rights[ [ of either property, or contracts." !d. He went on to draw a distinction 
hetween ex post facto laws and the hroader category of retrospective laws to which the 
former hdong, id. at 3l)J, and to argue that a law that "takes away, or imp<lirs, rights vested, 
agreeahly to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may he oppressive," 
id., hut th<lt some retrospective laws, like laws of ohlivion and pardon, may he just and for 
the hendit of the community, id. Chase evidently did not helieve that all laws that altered 
the legal effects of prior events were heyond the legislative power; if he had, he would have 
thought that acts of ohlivion were impossihlc. 
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II. VESTED RIGHTS, OLD AND NEW 
Another understanding of the difference between the two 
kinds of government authority does not turn wholly on the 
distinction between making and applying rules. That 
understanding takes some but not all legal interests to be immune 
to some forms of alteration by the legislature, but subject to 
adverse action by courts pursuant to pre-existing law, as when 
property is lost through a criminal fine. The nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century doctrine of vested rights combined substance 
and separation of powers in that fashion: although sometimes 
explained and justified on the basis of separation of powers, it 
protected some but only some legal interests fron1 alteration by 
the legislature. Seen as a separation of powers principle, it 
assumed that differences among legal interests were built into the 
definitions of legislative and judicial power. Although the 
Supreme Court has largely abandoned that doctrine, as I will 
explain, its current case law concerning legislative invasion of the 
judicial sphere resembles the old approach in that it protects some 
but only some legal interests from legislative alteration. Old and 
new doctrines are alike in that they do not rest simply on the 
difference between making and applying rules, but on differences 
among legal interests. 
A. NINETEENTH-CENTURY VESTED RIGHTS AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
For many decades, the basic doctrine of American 
constitutional law was that the government could not deprive 
people of vested rights. It could not take the property of A and 
give it to B.20 That principle was often attributed to the difference 
between legislative and judicial power.21 Only the latter could 
work deprivations of vested rights, and it could do so only 
pursuant to pre-existing legal rules, because judicial decisions 
must rest on the law as it stands. Legislatures may rnake new legal 
rules, but may not destroy vested rights when they do so. 
20. A classic discussion is Edwin S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American 
Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247 (1914). 
21. Professors Chapman and McConnell have recently explored in depth the 
st:paration of powers thinking that underlay the doctrine of vested rights. See Nathan S. 
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 
1672 (2012). They do not dwell on the point that the separation of powers principles they 
discuss were themselves suhstantive in that they distinguished among legal interests, 
limiting the lcgislatun; only with respect to vested rights and not other legal advantages. 
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The vested rights understanding of the separation of powers 
built differences among legal interests into the definitions of 
legislative and judicial power. Legislatures could not interfere 
with vested rights, not because they had to act generally and 
prospectively, but because they could not interfere with vested 
rights. As long as they avoided doing so, legislatures could change 
the legal consequences of earlier events, and could operate with 
great specificity. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this 
point came in those few states that actually banned retrospective 
laws. Their courts understood those provisions to bar only laws 
that interfered with vested rights.22 A voiding all retrospectivity 
was unreasonable and probably impossible. A voiding legislative 
forfeitures was mandatory. 
The criteria by which nineteenth-century courts 
distinguished between legal interests that legislatures could affect 
and those they could not reflected considerations of justice and 
the public interest. Judge Thomas Cooley, the pre-eminent 
scholar of vested rights doctrine in its mature phase later in the 
century, explained that legislation could not invade vested rights, 
even when the legislature acted in the public interest, but that 
22. From its adoption in 17X4 to today, the Constitution of New Hampshire has 
provided that "Retrospective laws arc highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such 
laws, therefore, should he made, either for the decision of civil causes. or the punishment 
of offenses." N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XXIII. In the nineteenth century. the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire concluded that the provision banned only those retrospective laws that 
interfered with vested rights. A leading case was Willard v. llarvey, 24 N.H. 344 (1X.'i2). In 
Willard, the defendant relied on a limitations period for the enforcement of judgments that 
had been adopted after entry of the judgment on which the plaintiff sought to collect. !d. 
at 3.'i1-3.'i2. Although the statute changed the legal consequences of the earlier judgment, 
the court upheld it, explaining that not all retrospective laws fell under the constitutional 
han on retrospective laws. "The broadest construction of the constitutional rules which 
forbid retrospective legislation, would require that all statutes affecting in any way a civil 
cause, must he so entirely prospective, that no new rule could he applied in the decision of 
a cause, which did not exist when the right of action accrued. But a construction so broad 
as this could not he reasonably held, since the effect would he that no change could he 
made in the courts or course of justice which would affect the actions or causes of action 
then existing." !d. at 3.'i2. The court's solution was the standard distinction between rights. 
which vest, and remedies, which do not. 'The courts. therefore. have everywhere 
recognized a distinction between statutes affecting rights, and those affecting remedies 
only. The rights of parties cannot he changed hy legislation; but no party has a vested right 
to any particular remedy." !d. (citation omitted). 
Tennessee also has a han on "retrospective" laws. TENN. CONST., art. I,* 20. In the 1X20s, 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee said that "This clause, taken in its common and 
unrestrained sense, extends to all prior times, persons and transactions, whether civil or 
criminal, yet, certainly, there arc some cases coming within its general scope. to which it 
docs not extend." Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1, 1.'i (1X21). 
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vested rights were not defined in any technical sense. Rather, a 
vested interest was one "which it is equitable the government 
should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived 
without injustice. "23 Insofar as the doctrine he expounded rested 
on separation of powers, it also rested on conceptions of 
legislative and judicial power that turned on questions of justice, 
not sin1ply the formal properties of different institutional actions. 
More recently, Professor Caleb Nelson has shown how 
nineteenth-century concepts of judicial, legislative, and executive 
power incorporated principles of political philosophy that 
distinguished among the interests an individual might hold under 
the law.24 Only the judiciary, not the legislature or the executive, 
could "declare that a competent private individual no longer 
retained core private rights previously vested in him.''25 Core 
private rights were defined in terms of the state of nature of 
Lockean political theory, and contrasted with privileges of 
individuals that were created by the legislature to further the 
public interest.26 The difference between natural ritghts and state-
created privileges, like the difference between just and unjust 
deprivations, reflects normatively relevant differences among 
legally protected interests. It does not simply reflect the difference 
between making and applying law. Like Cooley, Nelson 
elaborates on the substantive content of nineteenth century 
conceptions of legislative and judicial power. 
23. THOMAS M. COOLEY. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON 
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 35H (IX6X). For 
Cooky. the protection against legislative alteration that came with a right being vcstcu was 
a conclusion, dcrivcu from consiucrations of policy anu justice, anu not part of the concept 
of a right. His conception avoiucd circularity, hut only hy looking to consiuerations that 
uistinguishcu some legal interests from others. Cooley also cxplaincu that specificity hy 
itself uiu not make a legislative act invaliu, id. at 355, anu that "there arc numerous cases 
which holu that retrospective laws arc not obnoxious to constitutional objection, while in 
others they have hecn held to he voiu," id. at 370. Cooley uiscusseu ~evcral categories of 
permissible retrospective laws, such as changes in rcmcuics, id. at 361' anu in limitations 
periods. /d. at 364. 
24. Caleb Nelson, Adiudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 
(2007). 
25. ld. at 565. 
26. "Inspired hy Lockcan political theory, !nineteenth century Americans! 
uistinguishcu what I will call 'core' private rights (which Lockcan trauition associateu with 
the natural rights that indiviuuals woulu enjoy even in the absence of political society) from 
mere 'privileges' or 'franchises' (which public authorities had crcatcu purely for reasons of 
public policy anu which hall no counterpart in the Lockcan state of nature)." /d. at 567 
(footnote omitted). 
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B. THE COURT'S CURRENT DOCTRINE, SEPARATION, 
AND VESTED RIGHTS 
Little is left of the once basic doctrine. Congress has 
substantial authority to change the future legal consequences of 
past events. That authority extends to the consequences of many 
past events that created property rights.27 Most commentators 
today probably would explain this shift as a change in substantive 
due process doctrine, perhaps neglecting the separation of powers 
rationale of the earlier version. 
According to the Supreme Court today, separation of powers 
(at least at the federal level) does impose one quite specific limit 
on Congress' ability to change legal relations after the fact. Under 
Plaut v. Spendthr~ft Farnz,2x Congress may not reopen final 
judgments for damages in federal court. As I will explain, Plaut is 
like nineteenth-century jurisprudence in that it attributes to 
separation of powers a result that can be explained only by 
distinguishing some legal relations from others, and so recognizes 
a form of vested rights. 
Plaut grew out of Congress' response to an earlier decision 
by the Court, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson.29 In Lampf, the Court resolved a question that had 
divided the courts of appeals, and concluded that certain private 
federal securities fraud suits had to be brought within one year of 
discovery of the violation and three years of the violation itself.30 
After Lampf, a number of securities-fraud cases that were in 
progress when the case was decided were time barred, even 
though they had been timely filed according to court of appeals 
27. For example, in Usery v. Turner lc'lkhorn Mining Co., 42X U.S. I (1976), the 
Court upheld a federal statute that required mine operators to compensate miners for 
injuries that took place hcfore the statute was adopted. The Court explained that "[ijt is 
hy now well estahlished that legislative Acts adjusting the hurdens and hencfits of 
economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the 
hurden is on one complaining of a due process violation to estahlish that the legislature 
has acted in an arhitrary and irrational way." !d. at 15. The Court recognized that 
retroactivity could pose prohlcms that a prospective rule would not, id. at 17, hut found 
that "the imposition of liahility for the effects of disahilities hred in the past is justified as 
a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disahilities to those who have 
profited from the fruits of their lahor the operators and the coal consumers," id. at lX. 
Demanding such a rational connection is far from ahsolutely protecting vested rights, or 
treating retrospective imposition of liahility asperse heyond legislative power. 
2X. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
29. 501 U.S.350(1991). 
30. /d. at 364. 
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precedent applicable when and where they were brought.:11 While 
some of the plaintiffs in those cases pursued appeals, others let 
their cases go to final judgment for the defendant. Plaut was one 
of those.32 In response to Lampf~ which defeated expectations 
based on court of appeals precedent, Congress added Section 27 A 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 27 A provides that 
the limitations period for securities fraud cases filed before the 
clay on which Lampf was decided shall be the law applicable in 
the jurisdiction as of that elate. It also provides that cases like 
Plaut, which were dismissed as time-barred under Lampf but 
would have been timely under the limitations period set out in the 
statute "'shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff" if the 
motion is made within a period set out in the statute?3 
When the plaintiffs in Plaut moved to reinstate their action 
pursuant to the statute, the defendants challenged that provision 
on constitutional grounds, claiming that the instruction to re-open 
final judgments impermissibly intruded on the judicial power. The 
Supreme Court agreed, finding that Congress had exceeded the 
permissible bounds of legislation and sought to disrupt the judicial 
power by making a previously final judgment non-final.34 
On one reading Plaut was a purely formal decision, keyed to 
the formality that Congress employed to achieve its goal. The 
statute provided that cases already decided should be reopened. 
It did not give the plaintiffs in those cases a new cause of action, 
based on the same facts as underlay the earlier cases but subject 
to a different limitations period. The latter kind of statute would 
not, strictly speaking, have required that any case be reopened, 
though it would have produced the same result. It would have 
undermined the effect of a final damages judgment by limiting the 
judgment's preclusive reach, keeping it from applying to the 
newly-enacted rule governing prior events. Especially because the 
Court in Plaut spoke through Justice Scalia, it is possible that its 
holding turned on the formal point that Section 27 A told courts 
to reopen prior judgments. If that is so, Plaut is consistent with the 
31. Justice Stevens described the situation in his dissent in Plaut. See Plaut, 501 U.S. 
at 246-47. 
32. !d. at 213-14. 
33. !d. at 213-15. 
34. The Court reasoned that the judicial power granted by Article III is the authority 
to render dispositive judgments, and that "by retroactively commanding the federal courts 
to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this fundamental principle." !d. at 219. 
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principle that the legislative power can accomplish anything the 
judicial power can, but means that legislatures must make law the 
way legislatures make it, providing the rules that will govern cases 
rather than purporting to direct courts in their decision. 
More likely Plaut concerns the substance of congressional 
power and not the form through which it operates, and the Court 
would have come to the same conclusion had Section 27 A said 
that it created a new right for parties whose claims had been 
dismissed. The Court traced its understanding of separation of 
powers to the Framers' rejection of "a system of intermingled 
legislative and judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the 
colonies long before the Revolution, and which after the 
Revolution had produced factional strife and partisan 
oppression."~5 That reasoning treats the principle being applied as 
an important feature of the structure of government, not just a 
matter of proper drafting. The case does not, however, stand for 
the proposition that Congress may never require that judgments 
be revised in light of changes in the law. Justice Scalia explicitly 
did not disturb a line of cases in which the Court has found that 
injunctions should be adjusted to reflect changes in the law on 
which they rest, be it the law governing primary legal obligations 
or the law of remedies. ~fl 
The foundational decisions in that line of cases were made in 
the 1850s, in a case in the Court's original jurisdiction. In 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bebnont Bridge Company (Wheeling 
Bridge I),~7 the State of Pennsylvania complained that the 
Wheeling Bridge, which spanned the Ohio River at Wheeling, 
Virginia, was an obstruction to interstate commerce and a 
nuisance. The Court agreed, and ordered that the bridge be raised 
or removed. ~x Congress then passed a statute providing that the 
bridge was a lawful structure.~9 When Pennsylvania returned to 
the Court seeking enforcement of the injunction, the Court 
concluded in Wheeling Bridge II that the injunction should be 
dissolved because the applicable law on which it rested had been 
35. /d. 
36. /d. at 232-233. 
37. 54 U.S. SIX (1H51 ). 
3H. /d. at 57H. Wheeling is in the part of Virginia that heeame West Virginia in the 
1H60s. 
39. The Post Office Appropriation Act of IX52 JeclareJ the Wheeling Bridge to he 
a lawful structure. Act of August 31, 1X52, ch. CXL, * 6-7, 10 Stat. Ill, 112. 
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changed by the legislature.4° Congress, the Court found, had not 
sought illicitly to exercise the judicial power by deciding what was 
and was not an obstruction to commerce under the applicable law. 
It had exercised its power to regulate commerce by changing the 
law and making the bridge lawful, not finding that it was. Once 
the law had changed, the Court was obliged to adjust its decree 
accordingly. 41 The Court continues to follow Wheeling Bridge II, 
adjusting ongoing injunctions in federal court so that they match 
legislative changes in both the substantive and remediallaw.42 
Plaut thus means that any statute with the effect of 
overturning a final damages judgment is unconstitutional, even if 
formulated purely in terms of substantive entitlements like a right 
to damages.43 That doctrine does not rest on the difference 
between making and applying rules. The provision at issue in 
Plaut, considered as a change in legal relations, did not contradict 
the Court's decision in Lampf: because it was not and did not need 
to be an application of the law as it stood when Lampf was 
decided. Section 27 A was consistent with the assumption that 
Lampf correctly applied the law as it then stood. Supporters of 
legislative relief for parties disfavored by the declision may well 
have believed that the Court was right but that its decision 
nevertheless worked an injustice because it defeated reasonable 
expectations. One way to act on that belief is to create a new rule 
of law applying to earlier events. The parties disfavored by Lampf 
40. 59 U.S. 421, 43n-437 (1 X.S.S). 
41. /d. at429-431. 
42. In Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000), the Court upheld a provision of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act that stayed existing injunctions concerning prison conditions 
while those decrees were reconsidered in light of the new standards for injunctive relief 
provided hy the act. The Court explained that "as Plaut and Wheeling Bridge II instruct, 
when Congress changes the law underlying a judgment awarding such relief, that relief is 
no longer enforceahle to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law." /d. at 329. ThL: 
Court recently reaffirmed and applied that principle in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, Do S. 
Ct. 1310 (201n). "Congress, our dL:cisions make clear, may amend the law and make the 
change applicahle to pending casL:s, even when the amendment is outcome detL:rminative." 
/d. at 1317. 
43. Justice Scalia emphasized the retroactive character of Section 27A. Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 227 ( 1995). That focus on retrospectivity raises the 
possihility that he meant to distinguish, not hetween damages judgments and injunctions, 
hut hetween wholly prospective injunctions and all other remedies. No injunction is wholly 
prospective, however, in that every injunction rests on determinations ahout past events, 
just as damages judgments do. In order to prevail, the plaintiff seeking an injunction must 
estahlish facts identifying the plaintiff as the holder of an interL:st that is eligihle for 
protection through a judicial order. A plaintiff seeking specific performance, for example, 
must show that the parties made a contract. 
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were like Civil War veterans who received a benefit based on 
prior events that was not available to them under the law as it 
stood when those events took place. When Congress provided 
additional veterans' benefits after the fact, it did not contradict 
the conclusion that soldiers did not accrue those benefits when 
they served; it changed the law. 
Justice Scalia in Plaut seems not fully to have appreciated the 
Promethean character of the power to create any rule the law-
maker wishes and attach new consequences to prior events. 
Explaining why Section 27 A invaded the judicial power, he 
explained that "[h]aving achieved finality, however, a judicial 
decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with 
regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not 
declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that 
very case was something other than what the courts said it was. "44 
Congress in Section 27 A did no such thing. That provision was 
consistent with the correctness of Lampf when Lampf' was 
decided. Congress did not declare what the law was when Lampf 
came down, but rather what it was to be henceforth.45 To say that 
the law was one thing at time 1 and another at time 2 is simply to 
say that the law has changed. To say that the law cannot change, 
as the Court in effect did in Plaut, is simply to say that some rights 
are vested. 
Although Plaut does not rest on the difference between 
making and applying rules, it might be thought to derive from the 
distinction between legislative and judicial power as they appear 
in Articles I and III. The Court's reasoning suggests that it found 
in the latter a form of claim preclusion according to which a final 
judgment relative to certain facts bars later litigation based on 
those facts but on new law. If Article III itself mandates any form 
of claim preclusion for federal court judgments, it is not the 
version that Plaut assumes. The scope of claim preclusion depends 
on the scope of claims. Justice Scalia assumed what the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments calls the modern or 
44. /d. 
45. Perhaps J usticc Scalia and the Court were led astray hy their famous 
pronouncement that the judicial power is the power to say what the law is. See Marhury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 ( 1 X03). Although Chid J usticc Marshall may have meant to speak 
in an eternal present, with the fall of vested rights doctrine that statement is true only in 
the momentary, changcahlc present. Judicial power says what the law is at the time of 
decision, and sometimes what it was when the relevant events took place. It docs not lock 
legal relations in place, unless it creates vested rights. 
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transactional view. According to that understanding of claims, a 
claim includes all the grounds for a remedy growing out of some 
transaction, which it to say, some set of facts. 46 As the Restatement 
explains, earlier approaches took a narrower view. Under 
common law pleading, the claim associated with one writ often 
was distinct from that associated with another. Different claims 
were also thought to be associated with different primary rights. 
If any two primary rights differ, a right that existed when events 
took place and a right that did not exist then are different. 47 
Article III was drafted in the days of common law pleading and 
the separation of law and equity, not the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which replace common-law writs and bills in equity 
with one form of action. 4~ 
Conceived as the authority conclusively to apply law to 
particular facts, the judicial power much more plausibly gives rise 
to issue and not claim preclusion, to use contemporary 
terminology.49 In particular, a court can apply onlly the law that 
exists when it decides a case, and a legislature that creates new 
law does not call into question the court's earlier decision, nor 
does it reverse that decision the way an appellate court does. 
Claim preclusion extends beyond issue preclusion precisely 
because it reaches issues that the court did not decide. 
Plaut does not rest on the difference between legislation and 
adjudication, nor on a plausible view of the effect of judgments 
that is required by Article Ill. It is a doctrine of vested rights: the 
effects of past events with respect to monetary liability produced 
by a damages judgment may not be changed subsequently. 
Whether the Court's current doctrine should be 
characterized as substantive or structural is a more difficult 
46. RESTATEMI·NT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS* 24 (19X2). 
47. "But in the days when civil procedure still bore the imprint ol· the forms of action 
and the division between law and equity, the courts were prone to associate cl<1ims with a 
single theory of recovery, so that, with respect to one tr<1nsaction, a plaintiff might have as 
many claims as there were theories of the subst<1ntive law on which he could seck relief 
against the defendant. ... In those earlier days there was also some adherence to a view 
that associated claims with the assertion of a single primary right as accorded by the 
substantive law, so that, if it appeared th<1t the defendant had invaded a number of primary 
rights conceived to be held by the plaintiff, the pl<1intiff had the s<1me number of claims, 
even though they all sprang from a unitary occurrence." ld., * 24 cmt. a. 
4X. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (one form of action). 
49. RESTATEMJ·NT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS * 27 (19X2) (resolution of issues 
litigated and decided by court with _jurisdiction has preclusive effect between the parties in 
later litigation). 
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question, mainly because those categories have an uncertain 
boundary.50 However those concepts should be applied, the 
doctrine is based on differences in legal interests as opposed to 
the characteristics of governn1ent institutions. As the Re .... ·tatement 
explains, a damages judgment gives rise to a new right, a debt 
owed the plaintiff by the defendant in the amount of the 
judgment.51 Debts are payable in money, and so represent wealth 
or property in a quite abstract form, dissociated from any 
particular asset. An injunction gives rise to a quite different 
interest, the interest in the defendant's compliance with the 
court's order.52 Those legal interests are distinct, without regard 
to the functions of government institutions. 
Perhaps more striking is that undoing the judgment in a 
damages case, which means eliminating or creating a debt, is a 
pure transfer of wealth. For the beneficiaries of Section 27 A who 
had meritorious claims (the statute of limitations disregarded), 
that provision simply created a right to receive payment from the 
defendants that otherwise did not exist. Undoing a judgment for 
the plaintiff in a damages action would create a new obligation for 
the successful plaintiff to pay an amount equal to the judgment. 
Pure transfers were the canonical violation of the principle of 
vested rights: the legislature was not allowed to take the property 
50. The doctrine of Wht'eling Bridge II itself, as opposed to current doctrine, was 
definitely substantive and not structural in that it distinguished, not between damages and 
injunctions, hut between injunctions based on public rights, and decrees, whether granting 
damages or injunctions, based on private rights. The Court agreed that in general "the act 
of ICiongress cannot have the effect and operation to annul the judgment of the court 
already rendered, or the rights determined thereby in favor of the plaintiff. This, as a 
general proposition, is certainly not to he denied, especially as it respects adjudication 
upon the private rights of parties. When they have passed into judgment the right becomes 
absolute, and it is the duty of the court to enforce it.'" Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Company (Whet'ling Bridge//) 5l) U.S. 421,431 (IH55). Public rights, like the right 
of navigation, were different. "The case before us, however, is distinguishable from this 
class of cases, so far as it respects that portion of the decree directing the abatement of the 
bridge. Its interference with the free navigation of the river constituted an obstruction of 
a public right secured by acts of ICiongress." !d. 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS* 27 ( 1l)X2). 
52. The Court has not had occasion to discuss the status of possessory decrees under 
Plaut, and is not likely to have occasion to do so. A possessory remedy like replevin rests 
on the conclusive resolution of questions of ownership (and a judgment for the defendant 
in a possessory proceeding may also rest on the court's resolution of that question, though 
it need not). Ownership of a particular asset is so much like ownership of a specified sum, 
and so different from a pure rule of conduct that possessory decrees very likely would he 
treated like damages judgments under Plaut. 
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of A and give it to B.5:, Eliminating an injunction, by contrast, 
benefits the defendant and harms the plaintiff, but rnay have other 
consequences and lacks the exact correspondence of benefit and 
burden. Undoing an injunction is thus not necessarily pure 
redistribution. 
The protection for judicially-created rights found in Plaut is 
thus substantive in two important senses. First, it reflects 
differences in the interests protected by judgments that may and 
may not be undone by the legislature. Second, it reflects a 
difference that is of great importance from a policy standpoint, if 
the policy is one of limiting the legislature's power to bring about 
pure wealth transfers. In both respects today's doctrine closely 
resembles that of the nineteenth century, albeit it favors only 
rights created by judicial decree. 54 
Ill. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 
The main contention of this Essay is that the separation of 
legislative and judicial power has a surprising feature, however it 
is understood. If the distinction between the two powers tracks 
the difference between making and applying legal rules, then 
legislative power functions as a perfect substitute for judicial 
power. If not, that is because the difference between the two 
powers has built into it some more substantive component, the 
kind of substance that underlay classic vested rights doctrine. I 
have not sought to argue that one or the other conception is a 
better account of the powers referred to by Articles I and III of 
53. Corwin, supra note 20. at 247 (the two fundamental anteb~..:llum constitutional 
doctrines were the complementary principles of vested rights and the police power). 
54. Rule hO(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates changes in 
injunctions hut docs not mention damages or other judgments. That suggests another 
possible ground of distinction: injunctions may he changed because every injunction has 
built into it the possibility of changc, so alteration of an injunction docs not eliminate any 
right in the injunction created. Justice Scalia did not indicate that a similar provision with 
rcspcct to all fcdcral court judgmcnts would bc constitutional, and hc vcry likcly would 
regard onc as an impcrmissihk intrusion into thc judicial powcr; he did not rely on Rulc 
hO(b) in distinguishing cases likc WheelinR Bridge II. A rule about alli:ration of judgmcnt 
that turncd on the law of judgments as it stood when a casc was dccidcd would be anothcr 
form of vcstcd rights doctrine, onc that would cnablc legislaturcs to crcatc intcrcsts that 
thcy could not altcr in the futurc by deciding whcther to providc for altcration in the law 
ofjudgmcnts. 
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the Constitution.55 In this section, I will argue that the wholly 
structural understanding cannot be dismissed on the grounds that 
separating the powers is pointless if the legislative power Is so 
sweeping. 
Dismissal of that conception for that reason may seem 
unavoidable. Justice Scalia in Plaut said that the Constitution's 
system of judicial independence was founded on the "ruins" of 
early state constitutions in which the two powers were not 
separated, as they were not in Britain at the time.5h Article III 
creates a form of judicial independence. The judges are selected 
by joint action of two separately-elected institutions, President 
and Senate, and may be removed only with much difficulty.57 
Because they are independent, the courts are not simply the 
agents of the legislature the way lower-level executive officials 
may be thought to be agents of the President.5s But if legislatures 
can in effect decide and re-decide particular cases, courts are 
nothing but agents of the legislature and making the two 
institutions independent is pointless. Hence, there must be 
something that courts can do that legislatures cannot, not just in 
formal but in 1nore constraining terms. 
55. Answering that question requires resolving an interpretive difficulty that is itself 
important. Many, perhaps most, legally sophisticated people at the time of the Framing 
believed that some legal interests were immune from legislative alteration. Two lines of 
reasoning were available to support that conclusion. One was that the concept of legislative 
power included a limitation in favor of vested rights. The other was that vested rights were 
immune from legislative alteration because of a separate principle that operated as a limit 
on legislative power, as the First Amendment limits Congress' taxing power. Both lines of 
reasoning produce the same result, and so the fact that the result was widely accepted 
cannot itself support a choice between them. The problem of separating the meaning of 
constitutional concepts from non-constitutional legal principles that were generally 
accepted at one time hut arc not accepted now is a recurring one. Any resolution I could 
offer to the particular example of that recurring problem that involves separation of 
powers and vested rights would be at best provisional. It is not necessary to choose between 
the two possible understandings of the distinction between legislative and judicial power 
in order to sec that there arc two. 
56. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211,219 (1995). 
57. Federal judges arc appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, U.S. CONST., art. II,* 2, and serve on good behavior. it/.; id. at art. III.* I, subject 
to impeachment by the House of Representatives and removal by a two-thirds vote of the 
Senate, id. at art. I, * 2 (House shall have sole power of impeachment); id. at art. I, * 3 
(Senate shall try all impeachments, with two-thirds needed to convict). 
5X. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (President must have power 
to remove subordinate executive officers because he holds the power to execute the laws 
and has the duty to do so). 
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Judges' independence of the legislature, however, is justified 
even if the legislative power can accomplish any effect the judicial 
power can. First, Congress, like every state legislature, is subject 
to constitutional limits that go beyond the separation of legislative 
and judicial power. For that reason, no American legislature can 
make the law whatever it wants, and so none wields the entire law-
making power. Courts are obliged to apply the law, including 
those parts of the Constitution that limit or displace legislative 
acts. If the judges were dependent on the legislature for their 
salaries, they might be unwilling to perform the important 
function of looking to the superior law when it conflicts with a 
statute. 
More interesting is that judicial independence is useful even 
where the legislature does have the discretion to make the law 
what it wants. When the legislature has that ability, and the 
judiciary is independent, the legislature can control the judiciary 
but must do so through the written law (provided the courts are 
motivated to follow the law). While the written law will be 
effective, intimations from influential members of the legislature, 
implicitly backed by the threat of sanction or the promise of 
reward, will not be. If the legislature can neither harm nor hurt 
the judges, it cannot influence them through channels other than 
statutes. In a system in which the legislature has complete control 
over the substance of the law, judicial independence nevertheless 
furthers the goals of publicity and clarity. Independent courts, 
even if they have no power to fix the law in place, can facilitate 
the rule of law. 
